In recent years, many developing countries have intervened in foreign exchange markets to offset to some extent the effect on their economies of large capital flows. Often, changes in reserve requirements were used to mitigate the impact of that intervention on domestic money supplies. Because reserve requirements are a tax, however, changes in reserve requirements can have real effects. This paper shows that the exact implications for output, the real exchange rate, and the capital and current accounts depend importantly on who--whether depositors or borrowers--pays the tax. In any case, foreign exchange intervention matched by changes in reserve requirements that keep the money supply fixed do influence the exchange rate in the short and, sometimes, the long run. The recent experiences of ten developing countries establish that, while the incidence of the tax varies considerably across countries and time, both deposit and lending rates of interest respond to changes in reserve requirements.
1

I. Introduction
The experience of the 1990s provides ample evidence that international capital flows can be both sizable and changeable. Mexico and Thailand are but two recent examples in a long list of countries that have found that investors' favor can sour quickly. Given this history, it is not surprising that most of the developing countries receiving sizable inflows this decade resisted, in varying degrees, the nominal exchange rate appreciation that is typically associate with an increase in the demand for a country's assets.
Policies aimed at offsetting the pressures on the currency to appreciate have included a variety of fiscal austerity measures, liberalization of capital outflows, quantitative controls or taxes on capital inflows, and an opening of commercial policy. 1/ Most countries have also resorted to sterilized intervention at one time or another.2/ This reliance on sterilized intervention is at odds with the advice from theory. It is a standard result in international finance dating back to the Mundell-Fleming model of the early 1960s that, when assets are perfect substitutes internationally, sterilized intervention has no real effects. Sterilized open-market operations--the simultaneous sale (purchase) of domestic currency on the foreign exchange market and the offsetting purchase (sale) of domestic currency in the bond market--merely represents an exchange between the central bank's holdings of foreign and domestic securities. But when those assets are perfect substitutes, such a transaction should not affect prices of financial assets (Mundell, 1963) .
International economists have long struggled with the issue of whether this theoretical result holds in practice. Schadler et al., (1993) conclude that, in most of the developing countries that they examine, there is some scope for sterilization policies in the short run--i.e., changes in domestic credit are not instantly offset by changes in net foreign assets. Frankel and Ok ungwu (1996) , however, finds stronger 1/ Indeed, in most instances, reserve requirements are not remunerated.
2 evidence of perfect capital mobility in many of the developing countries that have experienced heavy capital inflows--casting greater doubt on any ability to influence exchange rates through sterilization.
Another line of work has argued that even if assets were perfect substitutes, sterilized intervention might serve an important role in signaling policy intentions. In effect, foreign exchange intervention might be viewed as the first step in a sequence of policy actions. In pricing foreign exchange, market participants would look past those essentially irrelevant operations to the changes in the domestic money stock that they foreshadow, leading to an association between intervention and changes in currency value (Mussa, 1981) . The evidence on this issue is mixed: Kaminsky and Lewis (1996) find little empirical support for the signaling hypothesis in the United States, while Dominguez and Frankel (1993) do.
Most of this literature, however, has neglected an important feature of the current practice of sterilized intervention in many developing counties. Central banks have tools to neutralize the effects on the money stock of their foreign exchange operations beyond offsetting domestic open market transactions. Importantly, they can move past their own balance sheets: The effect of the sale (purchase) of domestic currency could be offset by raising (lowering) reserve requirements to keep the money stock constant. However, as long as domestic reserves do not pay a competitive interest rate, reserve requirements are a tax on the banking system.1/ Changes in the tax can have real effects, including on the exchange value of the currency. Moreover, depending on the incidence of the reserve tax, domestic spending and production may change as well.
Determining the incidence of the reserve tax requires assessing the competitive position of the depository sector. We examine the two polar cases that appear in the banking literature, beginning with a reserve tax that is borne by those bank customers who only have poor substitutes for banking products. If deposits are somewhat unique while borrowers have open access to market finance, then depositors will pay the reserve tax in the form of below-market deposit rates of interest. Second, we examine the case where depositors have ready access to competing and equivalent market instruments while borrowers rely 1/ Most of the work on developing countries has focused on the use of reserve requirements as a form of financial repression (see, for instance, Mathieson, 1981, and Brock, 1989) . In that vein, this paper shares some similarities with Sussman's (1992) analysis of Israel's financial liberalization in the late 1970s. Like what will follow, Sussman emended Dornbusch's (1976) overshooting model. Unlike this paper, Sussman does not provide a microeconomic rationale for his assumed parameters representing financial repression. Papazoglou and Karadeloglou (1997) offer a model of exchange rate determination that explicitly includes a banking sector in which reserve requirements figure importantly. However, they do not consider alternative assumptions about the incidence of the reserve requirement tax or policy exercises varying that reserve requirement. On the real side of the economy, they assume that purchasing power parity holds.
3 exclusively on banks. Under these circumstances, the latter will pay the reserve tax in the form of abovemarket loan rates of interest.
This heterogeneity among rates of return can have important macroeconomic consequences. Even if global financial trading enforces real interest parity across market interest rates (such as in the Treasury market), there is room for central bank policy to affect deposit and loan rates if not all of the customers have ready access to international capital markets. Indeed, it could be argued that in many developing countries capital market integration is asymmetric, with the liability side of bank balance sheets more integrated than the asset side. To draw this point formally and to trace the consequences for income, prices, and the exchange rate, we extend Dornbusch's (1976) overshooting model. No matter our assumption about the incidence of the reserve tax, foreign exchange intervention paired with an offsetting change in reserve requirements has an immediate impact on the real exchange rate. Intuitively, if the central bank, say, were to sell domestic currency and raise reserve requirements to keep the money stock constant, it would also potentially make deposits less attractive (if depositors pay the reserve tax) or loans more expensive (if borrowers pay the reserve tax). In either case, the pair of policy actions would tend to exert downward pressure on the value of the home currency on foreign exchange markets on impact.
Thus, foreign exchange intervention can work, even if it does not affect the domestic money supply and market assets are perfect substitutes.
While there has been some recent work on the impact of reserve requirements on economic activity in industrial countries, notably Loungani and Rush (1995) , much less has been done with regard to developing countries.1/ As stressed by Dooley (1994) , this has been a serious omission, both because the range of policy variation in reserve requirements in developing countries has been large and because those 1/ In the cases where nonresident or foreign currency deposits were the main targets of the reserve requirement, the policy is tantamount to a capital control (see Dooley, 1995, and Smith, 1995) . 4 economies typically rely more on their banking sectors, giving those institutions important scope to exercise market power in deposit and loan pricing. To help fill that gap in the literature, this paper examines the experience of ten countries that have changed reserve requirements often in the past few years. The list of countries that have used changes in reserve requirements as a tool for sterilizing foreign exchange intervention includes Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, the Czech Republic, Kenya, Malaysia, Sri Lanka, Thailand, and, more recently in the wake of the December 1994 Mexican financial crisis, Argentina.1/ The next section briefly reviews the experiences of these developing countries that, when confronted with heavy capital inflows over the past few years, have used reserve requirements to offset the effects of their foreign exchange operations. Section III provides a brief exposition of the incidence of the reserve tax, while Section IV embeds that behavior into a fully specified macro-model. In light of these theoretical results, Section V examines the behavior of loan and deposit rates, as well as the evolution of money multipliers, in the developing countries that have changed their reserve requirements. Section VI offers concluding comments.
II. Some Background
Most of the literature on the use of reserve requirements in developing countries has focused on their role as a source of revenue for the government and as a tax on the banking system (see, for instance, Mathieson, 1981, and Brock, 1989) . This public finance perspective has been instructive because, indeed, developing countries have tended to maintain higher reserve requirements than industrial countries. Brock (1989) , for instance, finds evidence of a positive correlation in Africa and Latin America between the level of reserve requirements and the inflation rate, suggesting high reserve requirements were often used as a way of extracting a higher inflation tax. More recently, McKinnon and Pill (1994) have suggested that reserve requirements can play a useful role in mitigating some of the less desirable side-1/ Dooley (1994) is a recent exception.
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effects associated with exchange-rate-based inflation stabilization plans (i.e., consumption booms and "overborrowing"). However, relatively few studies on developing countries have focused on the frequent use of reserve requirements as a tool of monetary control.1/ Yet, the experiences of many developing countries during the 1990s highlights the importance of the use of reserve requirements in counter-cyclical monetary policies.
II. A. Reserve requirements as a response to shifting capital flows
Faced with a surge in capital inflows during the early 1990s, many developing countries in Asia, Latin America, Eastern Europe, and, to a lesser extent, Africa increased reserve requirements so as to reduce the money multiplier and curtail the monetary expansion associated with central bank purchases of foreign exchange (see Calvo, Leiderman, Reinhart, 1994 , Reinhart and Dunaway, 1996 , and Calvo, Sahay, and Végh, 1995 . Similarly, in the wake of the Mexican crisis of December 1994, some of the countries that experienced sudden capital outflows (notably Argentina and Brazil) lowered reserve requirements in an effort to inject some liquidity into the banking system at a time when foreign exchange reserves were being lost and domestic interest rates were approaching unsustainably high levels.
The reserve-requirement measures carried out recently have taken a broad variety of forms. Tables 1a and 1b document the considerable cross-country variation in the form and timing of these measures for periods of capital inflow and Table 2 looks at more recent episodes of outflows. Some countries have opted simply to increase the statutory reserve requirements in all or some categories of domestic currency deposits. Leading examples of this policy are Brazil, Costa Rica, Kenya, Malaysia, and Sri Lanka. Other countries, such as Brazil and Colombia, imposed high marginal reserve requirements. In several countries where banks offer foreign currency deposits--including Chile, and Sri Lanka--reserve requirements on these accounts were either imposed for the first time or increased. While this latter measure does not affect the narrow money multiplier, it does reduce the expansion in the broader aggregates, which include foreign currency deposits. In some instances the eligible liability base subject to reserve requirements was 1/ See Schadler, et. al. (1993) . 2/ Rojas-Suarez and Weisbrod (1994). 6 expanded (Brazil, Chile, Malaysia, and Thailand) by including previously exempt transactions (such as some types of loans) or some categories of deposits (such as nonresident deposits). In other instances, efforts were undertaken to strengthen the compliance with existing reserve requirements (Egypt).1/ Often, however, reserve requirement increases were complemented by other liquidity-absorbing measures, such as open market sales of Treasury bills or central bank paper and the shifting of government deposits from the banking system to the central bank (see Reinhart and Dunaway, 1995) . Hence, in some instances it is difficult to isolate empirically the effects on interest rates and deposit-lending interest rate spreads of the increase in reserve requirements.
II. B. The dominant role of banks in developing country finance
As the next sections show, determining the incidence of the reserve tax requires assessing the competitive position of the depository sector. A reserve tax is borne by those bank customers who only have poor substitutes for banking products. In many developing countries, both depositors and borrowers have limited options outside the banking system. As noted by Rojas-Suarez and Weisbrod (1994) in their analysis of the financial structure of Latin American countries, banks played a central role in providing short-term financing during the 1980s. Even in the early 1990s, despite a rapid expansion in other sources of finance (notably international placements of bonds and equity), bank loans remained the most important source of finance for the private sector.2/ As late as 1992, in eight of the eleven Latin American countries examined by Rojas-Suarez and Weisbrod, commercial banks accounted for more than three-quarters of the stock of net credit to the private sector. This differs markedly from patterns observed in most industrial countries, where bank finance competes with other sources of financing, such as issuance of bonds, equities, and commercial paper. By way of illustration, Table 3 compares the composition of financing in Chile, Germany, and the United States. At one end of the spectrum is the United States, where bank loans account for less than 12 1/ See, for instance, Singh and Hamid (1992) . 7 percent of corporate liabilities--at the other end is Chile, where banks account for three-fourths of corporate financing. For many other Latin American countries, that share is even higher.
In his analysis of the behavior of interest rates in selected Latin American countries, Rodriguez (1994) points to evidence of highly segmented credit markets. For countries that receive foreign currency deposits (for example, Argentina, Bolivia, Chile, Peru, and Uruguay), there is evidence of a two-tier loan market. The prime customers, which have access to international capital markets, tend to borrow in U.S. dollars at interest rates that are comparable to those charged to AAA grade customers. Small-and medium-size enterprises, which may represent higher credit risks (or higher information or transactions costs), usually borrow in domestic currency at interest rates that are well above those warranted by expected changes in the exchange rate.
The heavy reliance on commercial banks, however, is not limited to Latin America alone, but, in varying degrees, characterizes most developing countries. When comparing firms' financing patterns in a sample of developing countries from Africa, Asia, and Latin America to those in industrial countries, recent studies suggest that developing countries are unique because of their corporate sector's comparatively low reliance on internal sources of finance (i.e. retained earnings).1/ Firms in developing countries rely more heavily on external (that is, to the firm) financing sources, with the bulk of that financing done through banks. While many developing countries saw a dramatic rise in international issues of corporate bonds and equity during the early 1990s, this trend toward reduced reliance on bank financing appears to be thus far limited to large, top-tier enterprises.
III. The Incidence of the Reserve Tax
The conventional analysis of the effects of reserve requirements on bank behavior takes a public finance approach by considering it a problem of calculating the incidence of a tax. The requirement to hold noninterest-bearing reserves in some proportion to deposits imposes a tax, which is passed through to some extent to the firm's customers. As an intermediary, a banking firm has customers on both sides of 1/ Double-entry bookkeeping makes this language somewhat arbitrary. We described depositors as supplying funds and borrowers as demanding funds. We could as well have written about demands for deposits and supplies of loans.
8 their balance sheets--borrowers and depositors. Who pays the reserve tax depends on the structure of those markets, both on the competition of other financial intermediaries with the banking system as a whole and on the degree of competition within the banking system. As will become clearer below, the first margin--who competes with banks--determines whether depositors or borrowers pay the reserve tax. The second margin--how banks compete amongst themselves--determines the extent to which the reserve tax is shared among the customers and owners of banks.
III. A. When depositors pay
The standard approach to this issue (represented by Baltensperger, 1980, and Cagan, 1972) examines the behavior of a depository exploiting its market power over the provision of deposits but acting as a price taker in a national loan market.1/ As shown in the upper panel of Figure 1 , this financial intermediary faces an upward sloping supply-of-funds schedule, presumably because it has little local competition for its deposits or because product differentiation has made its deposits somewhat unique.
Taking account of this market power, the marginal cost associated with each additional unit of deposits slopes more steeply upward and lies above that supply curve.
The intermediary uses those deposit funds to make loans at the national rate of i. Because it is small in that national market, the demand schedule for loans is horizontal at i. Accordingly, the marginal revenue of each additional loan coincides with this line. The point of maximum profits for the bank, quite intuitively, is where this constant marginal revenue equals the marginal cost of deposit funds, or point A in the figure. The rate paid on deposits corresponds to point B on the supply schedule directly below A.
Profits equal the rectangle bounded by A, B, and the vertical axis.
In the lower panel of the figure, we consider the consequences of the imposition of reserve requirements. If this banking firm must set aside noninterest-bearing reserves on these deposits according to a proportional reserve requirement of ô, each unit of lending (which earns i) is associated with ô th of a 1/ This assumes that the bank held no reserves before the imposition of the reserve tax. More likely, the bank held reserves to meet customer clearing needs and to defend against runs (as in Diamond and Dybvig, 1983) . In that case, the marginal revenue schedule already embodied some added expense related to reserve holding. It would only shift with the imposition of reserve requirements to the extent that the tax was binding--that it required the bank to hold more reserves than it would voluntarily do.
2/ For example, under the assumptions already given, profits are written: B = iL -dD. For this intermediary, the imposition of a binding reserve requirement drives a wedge between loans and deposits, L=(1-J)D, so that profits are written:
If deposit supply is written, D = Ad " , profits will be maximized when d = ["/(1+")](1-J)i. 3/ In terms of the example in the previous footnote, assuming no market power is equivalent to making the coefficient " (the elasticity of supply) arbitrarily large. In that case, d = (1-J)i. 9 unit of reserves (which has an opportunity cost of i). Thus, the marginal revenue of lending falls from i to (1-ô)i, seen in the figure as a shift down in the horizontal line.1/ With lower marginal revenue and unchanged marginal costs, the bank reduces the scale of its intermediation and earns less profit (moving from point A to D in the lower panel of the figure). Intermediation through this bank has declined. As is standard in public finance, the incidence of the tax falls on the price--here the deposit rate--according to the slope of the supply schedule.2/ Thus, bank depositors and owners share the burden of the reserve tax.
The same diagram can be used to explain tax incidence in the absence of market power, if the supply-of-deposits curve were reinterpreted as applying to aggregate behavior. The banking system as a whole might face perfect competition in the market for loans, and no individual bank may be large enough to have any power in the deposit market. In that case, the market-equilibrium deposit rate is set at the intersection of the supply schedule and the horizontal lending schedule (point C in the upper panel). An increase in the reserve requirement shifts the horizontal line down by ô, implying that the deposit rate is reduced by a similar amount (seen as the move from points C to F).3/ If banks have no market power individually and face stiff competition in the loan market, depositors pay the whole of the reserve tax.
III. B. When borrowers pay
In 1985, Eugene Fama introduced an alternative paradigm for the incidence of the reserve tax. Fama (1985) noted that, in the United States, interest rates on large certificates of deposit usually equaled those on commercial paper. At that time, the former was subject to reserve requirements while the latter was not. To explain this, he reversed the assumptions about market power by considering a financial 1/ In this case, optimal lending volume determines the extent to which the bank taps the national deposit market, so that profits are written:
-$ , then the optimal lending rate equals:
10 intermediary confronted with a fixed cost of deposit funds, likely because its customers have alternative investment choices that are perfect substitutes for the bank's deposit product. As in the upper panel of Figure 2 , the average and marginal cost of funds would be constant at i, the national market rate. This bank, however, is assumed to have some market power in lending, perhaps because it has superior information about its local market that enables it to ascertain risks better than its potential competitors. In that case, the demand for loans slopes down and the marginal revenue from lending slopes more sharply down and lies below that curve. The profit maximizing scale of lending takes place where marginal revenue equals the constant cost of funds (point A) and loans are priced according to demand (point B).
If a reserve requirement is imposed, the bank cannot pass it through to its depositors because they are footloose. The cost of one unit of deposits, then, is the national market rate, i, plus the opportunity cost of the idle reserve balances, iô. That is, the reserve tax shifts up the horizontal deposit supply schedule by ô, seen as the shift in the bottom panel of the figure. The scale of intermediation declines, along with profits, and the loan rate rises (from points B to E in the upper panel of the figure).1/ The important conclusion from Fama's work is that the reserve tax, in this case, is borne by borrowers and bank owners, not depositors.
Again, this diagram can be used to explain market equilibrium if banks individually had no market power. Banks as a whole may face a downward sloped demand for funds but compete away any monopoly power among themselves. In that case, equilibrium is determined at the intersection of that demand schedule and the horizontal line representing the cost of funds. The imposition of reserve requirements shifts that horizontal line up by ô, which gets fully passed through to loan rates (seen as the move from 1/ Relative to the example in the previous footnote, competition makes $ (the sensitivity of loan demand) arbitrarily large. As a result, l = [1/(1-J)]i. 11 point C to F in the lower panel). If the banking system faces perfect competition for deposit funds and competes away any power in the loan market, then borrowers pay the reserve tax.1/ Experience in a particular country most likely lies somewhere between the two extremes presented here. The general message from these two examples is that the incidence of a reserve tax will fall on those classes of assets or liabilities for which banks enjoy some market power. It cannot fall on a market where there are close substitutes for the services that banks provide, because those bank customers will simply disappear.
IV. Wider Consequences of Reserve Requirements
In this section, we weave together the two strands of our previous discussion. Faced with capital inflows, some central banks have intervened in the foreign exchange market, purchasing foreign currency with their own currencies. To prevent the changes in its balance sheet from affecting their domestic monetary aggregates, they have often sterilized those interventions. In many cases, these policy actions to sterilize have included raising reserve requirements. Our brief consideration of a simple banking model suggests that a change in reserve requirements will be passed through in whole or in part to those markets--whether for deposits or loans--where banks have some monopoly power. Thus, the broader consequences of a reduction in the supply of money through an increase in reserve requirements depend importantly on the incidence of that tax.
IV. A. A simple macro model
We take a short-term focus, tracing the implications of a change in reserve requirements in a model in which capital flows are not explicitly modeled, but expectations about the exchange rate enter and monetary policy has potent, transitory real effects. That is, we adapt the workhorse of the international Dornbusch's (1976) overshooting model--to this issue, following fairly closely the version of that model presented by Mussa (1984) .
We assume that international arbitrage is enforced by the depository sector by virtue of their perfect access to the world capital market. Domestic banks can lend or borrow in foreign currency at the world nominal interest rate of i * . The nominal return on the sole domestic market instrument, which is denominated in the home currency, is denoted by i. Domestic banks issue deposits bearing a nominal return of d in home currency terms and make loans at the rate l in the home currency. The spreads of these rates to the comparable market rates are, and depend on the monopoly power of banks in each of those markets and the structure of reserve requirements. Modeling the incidence of the reserve tax, then, reduces to describing the extent to which the two margins (ä,ë) vary as reserve requirements change. We follow the simpler of the assumptions of market structure that were examined in the previous section: (i) Banks compete amongst themselves sufficiently that none can exploit monopoly power, and (ii) there exists a perfect substitute provided by a nonbank intermediary for the products on one side of bank balance sheets. The first assumption implies that bank customers bear the reserve tax completely. As for the second assumption, because there are two sides to a balance sheet, we will have to consider two cases for the incidence of a reserve tax.
In case A, we assume that there is a perfect substitute for the banking system's loans, while in case B we assume that there is a perfect substitute for the banking system's deposits. To simplify the algebra, define an indicator variable, E, that takes two values, E = 1 for case A and E = 0 for case B. The equations for deposit and loan rates in both cases can be expressed compactly as:
1/ Lower case nominal magnitudes are in logarithms. Time subscripts will be suppressed unless absolutely necessary. This assumption of imperfect substitutability is one of the key differences of this model with that of Papzoglou and Karadeloglou (1997) .
where a 2 , a 3 > 0 (4) with corresponding spreads
As for the rest of the economy, there are two types of goods, which are imperfect substitutes in consumption: those produced domestically and priced at p and those produced abroad and priced at p * in terms of the foreign currency.1/ The exchange rate, s, is quoted as foreign currency per unit of domestic currency so that the relative price of home goods (i.e., the real exchange rate) can be defined:
Note that equation (3) implies that an increase in è represents a real appreciation.
Aggregate expenditure, y, consists of real-interest-and relative-price-sensitive domestic demand and net exports, where l is the nominal lending rate and ð is the expected change in home goods prices. The presence of a lending, rather than a market, interest rate in the equation explaining aggregate demand is done to capture the stylized fact described by Rojas-Suarez and Weisbrod (1994) : In developing countries, firms rely on 1/ Calculating inflation in terms of an index that averages domestic and foreign prices does not materially alter the discussion. Similarly, it is a simple matter that does not affect the results to allow the possibility that some domestic borrowers--presumably large firms--have access to the world capital market and can transact at i rather than l.
external finance, predominantly supplied by banks, to fund spending projects.1/ By including a loan rate in aggregate demand, we are implicitly assuming that the effects of credit on the economy can be described in terms of prices alone. Thus, as in Bernanke and Blinder (1988) , credit supply can be important even in the absence of nonprice rationing. Domestic goods prices respond sluggishly to excess demand, with the markup over foreign prices written:
where a dot above the letter denotes the time derivative and an overscore represents the steady-state value of a variable; thus, ȳ is the economically-efficient long-run level of output. Rearranging terms, we obtain a relationship that explains the behavior of the real exchange rate over time, Domestic investors choose among three types of assets: the home money (which comprises currency and local-currency-denominated deposits and is denoted m in logarithmic terms) and home and foreign market instruments. Foreigners do not hold domestic currency and the demand for money is assumed to depend positively on the return to domestic deposits and negatively on the return on the competing domestic asset:
Because the currency component of the monetary aggregate does not earn interest, it follows that h 2 should be greater than h 1 to retain the familiar downward slope between real balances (which are defined as x = m-1/ The results that follow still hold if money demand was allowed to depend positively on output.
p) and the nominal market interest rate.1/ As for monetarypolicy, we assume that the central bank keeps the nominal stock of money along a constant growth rate path of µ.
The cornerstone to the Dornbusch model holds that the domestic and foreign marketable instruments are perfect substitutes so that, adjusted for any expected change in the exchange rate, they provide the same return; assuming perfect foresight, this implies:
We assume that it is the actions of depositories that makes this so. The arbitrage condition can be written in a form that links real rates of return across countries, as in:
where r * is the foreign real interest rate. Thus, real interest parity obtains, as differing real rates of return across countries compensate for expected changes in the real exchange rate.
Adding the loan rate-spread to both sides of the previous equation yields an explanation for the real cost of capital at home that can be substituted into our behavioral explanation of expenditure, equation (4), Note that we have two implicit explanations of the level of real output, from the spending relationship and the Phillips' curve. Equating these two explanations yields a differential equation explaining the change in the real exchange rate,
This system is not closed, however, because ë may depend on the level of the nominal domestic market rate, depending on who bears the reserve tax, as in equation (2). The nominal rate itself, depends on the level of real balances, which we can see by inverting the money demand equation (6), Substituting the explanations for the spread and the nominal rate into equation (9) we obtain a relationship in the real exchange rate and real balances, where:
As already explained, both ö and á must be negative to preserve a negatively sloped money demand equation. The standard assumption in this literature holds that ã is positive (as in Mussa, 1984) , which we maintain here. Also note that both ö and á depend on the incidence of the reserve tax, E.
Equation (8) can be rearranged to explain domestic inflation, which implies that real balances change according to:
This is an equation in two parameters, µ and r * , and two behavioral relationships, è (which is explained by equation (11)) and i (which is explained by equation 10). Making
those substitutions yields, a differential equation in the real exchange rate and real balances.
Equations (11) and (12) define a system in real balances, a continuous variable, and the real exchange rate, a jump variable. Putting those equations in more compact form, we have:
These equations determine two steady-state relationships between real balances and the real exchange rate, but the parameters of those relationships depend on the reserve-incidence indicator, E. However, note that the determinant of the transition matrix equals ãa 3 ö, which is always negative, regardless of the assumption about the incidence of the reserve tax. Thus, this system always satisfies the saddlepathstability condition of having one positive and one negative characteristic root. As a result, for any given level of real balances, there is one level of real exchange rate that sets off a dynamic path toward the steady state. The determination of the steady state and exact dynamics about that steady state depends on who pays the reserve tax.
IV. B. When depositors pay
If the incidence of the reserve tax falls on depositors, then the indicator variable E equals 1 and the parameter á equals 0. As a result, the dynamic system given by equation (13) simplifies to:
As shown in Figure 3 , the real exchange rate is only at rest at its long-run value of --the locus è ÿ è ' 0 determines a unique long-run real exchange rate. As a result, there is no scope for the growth rate of the nominal money stock or the specification of the demand for money (which only appears in the ÿ x=0 locus) to influence the real exchange rate in the long run. If depositors pay the reserve tax, a long-run, classical dichotomy holds, and money is superneutral. The ÿ x=0 locus slopes downward, because higher values of real balances provide stimulus to spending that, to keep real balances unchanged, must be offset by an appreciated real exchange rate. The intersection of these two schedules determines the unique steady-state solution to the model.
As suggested by the arrows in the figure, the unique, convergent transition path to the steady state--the saddlepath--slopes downward, which is the essence of Dornbusch's overshooting result. An increase in the nominal stock of money raises the level of real balances on impact (as goods prices only adjust gradually). With real balances higher, the domestic nominal interest rate must be lower. To satisfy the interest-parity condition, this implies that the exchange rate--in real and nominal terms--must be expected to appreciate over time. However, because money is neutral, a once-off change in the nominal money stock cannot affect the value of real variables in the long run. Thus, the expected appreciation must commence from a lower base level if the real exchange rate is to end unchanged. That is, the nominal and real exchange rate must depreciate on impact so that they can then appreciate gradually over time. If an event makes x larger than its steady-state value, market participants can choose a unique level for the real exchange rate (one that is lower than its steady-state value because the saddlepath is negatively sloped) consistent with perfect foresight and a stable return to the steady state.
The core exercise of this paper is to consider the impact of a permanent change in reserve requirements, which is depicted in Figure 4 . Specifically, we consider an increase in domestic reserves in the banking system--which would follow from the intervention purchase of foreign currencies on the exchange market--matched perfectly by an increase in reserve requirements that leaves the nominal stock of money constant. That is, m and x are predetermined but ô rises.
1/ It is important to remember that reserve requirements might be raised for prudential reasons as well as to further macro objectives (which is the topic of Dooley, 1996) . For instance, a central bank might raise J to induce disintermediation in order to reduce distortions in the conomy related to an overreliance on deposit guarantees. In this example, that policy aim is achieved: In the steady state, spending is unchanged but real balances are lower. However, the model also suggests that such prudential policy can have real effects on spending during the transition to that steady state.
As already noted, monetary matters do not enter the locus, so that it remains fixed at its ÿ è ' 0 stead-state value. Only the parameter ö, which is the inverse of the interest semi-elasticity of money demand, changes by the amount, The parameter ö becomes less negative when ô rises, because when depositors pay a larger reserve tax, a given change in market rates spurs a larger change in money demand than before.
The parameter ö affects both the slope and the intercept of the ÿ x=0 locus. An increase in reserve requirements, as shown in Figure 4 , flattens the ÿ x=0 line and shifts it to the left (as from the dashed to the solid line). The tilting down to the steady-state locus rotates the saddlepath down as well. Essentially, raising ô to keep the money supply unchanged lowers the demand for money by making deposits less attractive. With the nominal stock of money predetermined by its fixed-growth-rate rule, there has to be a bit extra inflation (above µ) temporarily to erode the level of real balances. The currency depreciates on impact in recognition of that acceleration in domestic prices, generating excess demand through net exports. The spending boom is ephemeral, as real balances decline to their new lower steady-state level and the real exchange rate appreciates back to its unchanged long-run level. Even though marketable assets are perfect substitutes internationally, the purchase of foreign currency offset by an increase in reserve requirements puts downward pressure on the value of the currency in exchange markets, raises the velocity of money in the long run, and has transitory effects on the real exchange rate and spending.1/ Likewise, a temporary increase in reserve requirements also results in an initial depreciation of the real exchange rate followed by an eventual appreciation and return to the original equilibrium level.
IV. C. When borrowers pay
] > 1.
If the incidence of the reserve tax falls on borrowers, then the indicator variable E equals 0. No simplification of the two-variable system defined in equation (13) is possible, although the parameters of behavior that appears in those equations and that depend on E now reduce to:
The lack of any simplification in the dynamic system, itself, is a significant result: The steady-state values of real balances and the real exchange rate must be determined mutually, implying that this assumption of the incidence of the reserve tax breaks down the classical dichotomy associated with the superneutrality of money. How real and nominal magnitudes interact depends on the properties of the two steady-state loci.
Inspection of the locus, equation (13), shows that the classical dichotomy was lost ÿ è ' 0 because the premium depositories charge on their loans enters directly into the determination of spending, in the same manner as the world real rate. The loan spread depends positively on the level of the domestic nominal market interest rate. If the nominal interest rate rises, then the loan rate spread widens and the home currency must depreciate in the new steady state to attract net exports to replace the portion of interest-sensitive spending that was choked off. By the money-demand equation, the nominal rate is negatively related to the level of real balances, so the locus must slope up. ÿ è ' 0 The slope of the ÿ x=0 locus, in contrast, is ambiguous, because the term M(ÿ x)/Mx can be either negative or positive. The upper panel of Figure 5 considers the case when that term is negative, which holds when Algebraically, the change in the real exchange rate differs from domestic inflation (or from the change in real balances, which is just µ-ð) because of changes in foreign prices in terms of the home currency. That
Äô wedge, in turn, can be explained by the interest parity condition. To capture that difference, the nominal interest rate is included in the ÿ x=0 equation--which is essentially all that makes the two steady-state loci in equation (13) different. If ãa 2 is relatively large, then any effect of changes in real balances on the nominal rate (and therefore on s) is swamped by the effects on the real exchange rate--so that the ÿ x=0 locus slopes up in the same manner as the locus, although it is not as steep. The dynamic arrows imply that ÿ è ' 0 the transition path to the steady state slopes downward, preserving the overshooting of the real exchange rate for any unanticipated change in real balances. The lower panel of the figure examines the case when, so that movements in the nominal rate bulk larger relative to è when real balances change. As a result, the ÿ x=0 locus slopes downward; here again, though, the saddlepath slopes downward and overshooting is observed.
As shown in Figure 5 , assumptions about the incidence of reserve requirements do not matter for the general result that changes in real balances have potentially strong but transitory effects on the real exchange rate. Assumptions about the incidence of the reserve tax, however, have important consequences on the determination of real and nominal magnitudes in the long run. When borrowers pay the reserve tax, changes in the growth rate of the nominal stock of money, which shift the ÿ x=0 locus, have an effect on the steady-state real exchange rate because there is slope to the locus. That is, money is no longer ÿ è ' 0 superneutral. Figure 6 considers the impact of an increase in reserve requirements associated with an unchanged stock of money. Examining the two equations given by equation (13), it is straightforward to show that, at an unchanged level of real balances, both the ÿ x=0 and loci shift by ÿ è ' 0 1/ The formal model of fixed echange rates would follow Sussman (1992) by setting the expected change in the exchange rate equal to zero and solving for the implied path of the stock of domestic money.
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in terms of è. The ambiguity of the ÿ x=0 locus poses no problem for predictions about the effect of policy.
An increase in ô shifts both schedules down in equals amounts, implying that the initial steady-state level of real balances is consistent with a lower steady-state real exchange rate. No dynamic adjustment is required--an increase in ô will be associated with an immediate step-down in the real exchange rate. As before, exchange-market intervention to support the foreign currency that is matched by an offsetting change in reserve requirements will lower the value of the real exchange rate. But when the incidence of the reserve tax falls on borrowers, the effect is permanent. A temporary increase in reserve requirements, when borrowers pay, also results in an initial depreciation of the real exchange rate followed by a further depreciation and an eventual reversal, as all variables return to the original equilibrium level.
IV. D. Reserve requirement changes and fixed exchange rates
Thus far, the model and the discussion have focused exclusively in the case where the nominal exchange rate is allowed to float freely. However, many of the countries that have recently employed countercyclical reserve requirement policies have either a fixed exchange rate or one that is heavily managed. Hence, it is useful to briefly discuss the effects on an increase in reserve requirements under such an exchange rate arrangement.1/ In a fixed exchange rate world, an increase in reserve requirements that exclusively alter deposit rates of interest will have no real short-run or long-run effects on the real variables. The increase in deposit interest rates reduces the demand for money, inducing the central bank to sell foreign exchange and buy domestic currency in order to keep the exchange rate fixed. Simply, the decline in the demand for money is accommodated by a reduced supply.
When borrowers pay, there are both short-run and long-run effects on output, the real exchange rate, and the trade balance. The increase in the real lending rate, tends to reduce output--now there is no immediate offset from the real exchange rate--the adjustments to the real exchange rate are gradual, as 23 these are effected through inflation. As the output gap widens, inflation falls and the real exchange rate depreciates to its new equilibrium level. The current account improves.
V. Some Evidence
This section examines the short-run behavior of deposit and lending rates of interest during more than twenty episodes in ten countries in which reserve requirements were adjusted as part of the macroeconomic policy response to large shifts in international capital flows. As the previous sections highlights, the macroeconomic effects of the reserve policy depend importantly on who pays the reserve tax. Furthermore, it can be expected that the macroeconomic effects of the policy also depend crucially on its effectiveness in collecting the reserve tax. If the reserve tax is easily circumvented through disintermediation and the establishment or growth of nonbank financial institutions, then the macroeconomic consequences of the reserve policy are likely to be limited. In that case, the effect of the change in reserve requirement on the money multiplier, particularly for a broader measure of money, is also bound to be small. In turn, if the growth of the monetary and credit aggregates is largely unaffected, then there is little reason to expect that economic activity, the real exchange rate, and the external accounts will be affected by the change in reserve requirement. Reserve requirement changes would be as ineffective as sterilized intervention under the usual assumption about perfect asset substitutability. To assess this issue, we examine the behavior of the money multipliers around the time of the change in the reserve requirement.
V. A. Interest rates and changes in reserve requirements
During most of the 1990s, all the countries in our sample experienced a surge in capital inflows and accumulated foreign exchange reserves. Hence, most of the episodes examined (20 out of 25) involve increasing reserve requirements to mop up the liquidity created by central bank purchases of foreign exchange. Tables 4a and 4b document the evolution of key deposit and lending rates of interest, as well as spreads, around the time of the changes in reserve requirements chronicled in Tables 1a and 1b . Monthly data are used to trace out the path of each variable from the month prior to the increase in reserve 1/ Interest rates are monthly averages of daily rates. 2/ Further, in a number of additional instances nominal lending rates did not rise because there were marked declines in the inflation rate at the time of the change in the reserve requirement. 24 requirements (labeled t-1 in the tables) until two months following the event. Several qualifications should be stressed before interpreting these figures. First, in some instances, interest rates do not respond contemporaneously to the change in reserve requirements and adjustments are not evident until the following month (t+1). This need not reflect a sluggish adjustment on the part of banks but may simply be due to the timing of the change in reserve requirements, which may occur late in the month.1/ Second, care is needed in interpreting the changes in individual interest rates. For example, on July 1, 1994 Brazil introduced substantive increases in reserve requirements while at the same time nominal lending rates fell sharply. On the surface this behavior appears inconsistent with profit maximizing banks. However, the decline in lending rates was entirely due to the abrupt decline in inflation associated with the implementation of the third phase of the "real" plan. Indeed, in this episode, the decline in deposit rates was even larger and the lending-deposit rate spread widened noticeably (Table 4b ). Third, other factors that directly affect nominal interest rates, such as exchange rate and fiscal policy or foreign interest rates, were not constant as the changes in reserve requirements were implemented. Similarly, the decline in deposit rates of interest in Malaysia in January 1994 need not be entirely attributable to the reserve requirement change--capital controls, which barred domestic residents from selling short-term assets to foreigners, were also introduced at that time.
With these caveats in mind, the data presented in Tables 4a and 4b reveal two important regularities. First, in nearly all cases (17 out of the 20), deposit-to-lending interest rate spreads widen on the wake of an increase in reserve requirements. Second, both depositors and borrowers pay the tax; in 14 episodes deposit rates of interest fell on the month of the change in reserve requirements or in the following month. In 12 of the episodes lending rates rose; in about one half of the cases both interest rates adjusted in a way predicted by theory.2/ Further, in some cases where lending rates did not fall in nominal terms at the time of the change in reserve requirements, inflation was also declining (Argentina, 1993 and Brazil, 1994 are examples of this phenomenon).
V. B. Money multipliers
Tracing the direct effects of changes in reserve requirements on macroeconomic variables is complicated because changes in other policy variables (exchange rate, fiscal, and structural policies) and exogenous factors (international interest rates and terms-of-trade) were also taking place. One can be certain that the transmission mechanism stressed in our theoretical model--through which monetary policy affects output, the real exchange rate, and the current and capital account balances--would not be operative if the reserve tax is circumvented. Hence, a necessary condition for these macroeconomic effects to materialize is that the "microeconomic" effects on interest rates and money multipliers are in place. Tables 5a and 5b show the evolution of the money multipliers around the time when required reserves were changed. In almost all instances, the narrow money multiplier fell on or in the month following the change in reserve requirements. The exception is Chile, where in both of the episodes where reserve requirements on dollar deposits were raised, the broad money multiplier actually increases.
However, this pattern need not suggest circumvention--it simply attests to the fact that, in Chile, dollardenominated deposits account for a small share of total bank deposits. Declines in the broad money multipliers were less common (13 out 17). However, not all the decline in both narrow-and broad-money multipliers need be exclusively attributed to increases in reserve requirements. For instance, the marked declines shown for Brazil in mid-1994 are not likely to be entirely attributable to the hike in reserve requirements, as an abrupt decline in inflation (such as the one that takes place at that time) is likely to increase the public's demand for currency --a factor that also reduces the multiplier. However, taken together, the evidence presented on Tables 5a and 5b suggests that policy was effective, at least in the short run, in curbing the monetary expansion.
VI. Conclusion
1/ Of course, the long-run fall in real balances when reserve requirements rise may be exactly the goal of a central bank attempting to shrink bank balance sheets for prudential reasons. A message from this paper is that this long-run outcome is associated with transitory consequences for spending and the real exchange rate.
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The wider consequences of a distortionary reserve requirements tax will depend on where it falls. If it only affects depositors, then the only real variable altered in the long run with a change in reserve requirements is real balances. However, all nominal magnitudes must adjust. When prices are sticky, the adjustment necessarily entails transitory real effects.1/ If the incidence of reserve requirements falls on borrowers, then the real domestic loan rate in relation to the world real interest rate rises. The real exchange rate must depreciate to support spending. Intuitively, the larger the proportion of borrowers without access to world credit markets who must transact at the domestic loan rate, the greater is this effect.
The perfect substitutability of market assets internationally does not pose an insuperable barrier to exchange market intervention, as long as that policy action is paired with another policy action that has real effects. In the literature on signaling (as in Mussa, 1981, and Kaminsky and Lewis, 1994) , sterilized foreign exchange intervention that presages a realignment in domestic policy will have real effects. In this paper, foreign exchange intervention that triggers a concurrent tax change--a change in the reserve tax--will have real effects. When central bankers pair the purchase (sale) of foreign currency with an increase (decrease) in reserve requirements, they get the effect on the currency that they expected, although perhaps not for the exact reasons that they had expected.
It is important to recognize that this model kept many dynamic aspects relevant to the discussion of reserve requirements in the background. Importantly, we implicitly held the distribution of capital in the financial industry fixed. Presumably, if some segment of the industry were disadvantaged by a tax, other firms that are exempt from the tax will flourish. Reserve requirements provide an incentive for the creation of new tax-free instruments and encourage potential customers of banks to consider other providers of financial services, including mutual funds, insurance companies, offshore financial 27 institutions, and markets directly. Particularly when there are fixed costs to forming customer-firm relationships, business lost to the banking sector may be gone forever.
If such competitive matters concern policy makers, the distortionary effects of reserve requirements would be eliminated if the central bank were allowed to pay a market-related interest rate on its reserves.
But then any macroeconomic consequences owing to the uneven incidence of reserve requirements that were considered in this paper would evaporate.
With regard to the evidence from developing countries that have used changes in reserve requirements for the purpose of sterilizing foreign exchange intervention (i.e. increasing reserve requirements when central bank purchases of foreign exchange are rising). Several empirical regularities emerge. First, in nearly all cases considered deposit-lending interest rate spreads widen on the wake of an increase in reserve requirements. Secondly, both depositors and borrowers pay the tax; in 13 out of 20 episodes deposit rates of interest fell on the month of the change in reserve requirements or in the following month, while in 12 of the episodes lending rates rose. Third, in almost all instances both the narrow and broad money multiplier fell on impact or in the month following the change in reserve requirements. Hence, the policy was effective, at least in the short run, in curbing the monetary expansion. 
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